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ETERNITY, AWARENESS, AND ACTION 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
Our article "Eternity" (1981), in which we presented, defended, and applied 
the traditional doctrine of divine eternity, prompted some criticisms that focus 
on difficulties in the concept of eternity itself. In the present article we 
summarize our original account of the doctrine before offering versions of 
two such criticisms and replying to them. Our replies are intended to clarify 
and develop further the essential notions of eternity's atemporal duration and 
of its relationship with time. 
1. Introduction 
In an earlier article I we presented, defended, and applied the traditional 
doctrine of divine eternity, the doctrine that God's mode of existence is 
timeless, characterized essentially by "the complete possession all at once of 
illimitable life. "2 We argued that the traditional conception of God as the 
absolutely perfect being entails eternity as his mode of existence. No life that 
is imperfect in its being possessed with the radical incompleteness entailed 
by temporal existence could be the mode of existence of all absolutely perfect 
being. The necessarily beginningless, endless life of a perfect being must also 
be possessed perfectly. That means that it must be devoid of any past, which 
is no longer possessed, and of any future, which is not yet possessed. The 
existence of an absolutely perfect being must be an indivisibly persistent 
present actuality. 
Our article prompted some criticisms that attacked the concept of eternity 
directly, by focusing on difficulties in the notion of atemporal duration, which 
we take to be at the heart of the concept,3 or on difficulties in the relationship 
between eternity and time, a relationship presupposed by all traditional theo-
logical applications of the doctrine. Some of those criticisms have already 
been satisfactorily addressed in the literature, but there are others that strike 
us as particularly important and requiring further clarification of the doctrine 
or modifications in our presentation of it." 
After briefly summarizing the doctrine of eternity as we originally pre-
sented it, we introduce versions of each of these two sorts of objections 
and reply to them. In doing so we hope to clarify and extend our original 
account. 
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2. Eternity Summarized 
The ancient and medieval philosophers who first argued for eternity under-
stood it as the mode of existence requisite for whatever they considered to 
be the foundation of temporal existence-for being as contrasted with be-
coming, or for the absolutely perfect being as contrasted with the various and 
necessarily imperfect manifestations of perfect being in material, temporal 
being. With the possible exception of Parmenides, no ancient or medieval 
philosopher who accepted eternity as a real, atemporal mode of existence 
meant thereby to deny the reality of time or to suggest that all temporal 
experiences are illusory. In introducing or drawing on the concept of eternity, 
they treated eternity and time as two separate modes of real existence. Eter-
nity is a mode of existence that is on their view neither reducible to time nor 
incompatible with the reality of temporal existence. The resultant concept of 
eternity, especially as developed by such Christian philosophers as Augustine, 
Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas, has four ingredients: life, illimitability, du-
ration, and timelessness.s The combination of these ingredients obviously 
gives rise to difficulties, some of which we discussed in "Eternity." 
The Extension and Timelessness of Eternity 
3. The Terminology of Duration and Timelessness 
As we've already said, the most flagrant of the difficulties arises from the 
combination of duration and timelessness. Of course, if the duration implicit 
in the definition of eternity counts as persistence through time, the ordinary 
meaning of 'duration,' then the combination of duration with timelessness is 
incoherent. But, as we explained in our 1981 artic1e,6 the philosophers who 
developed the concept of eternity were led to use familiar terms in unfamiliar 
ways in trying to express the novel notion of a life possessed completely all 
at once. 7 In particular, 'duration,' familiar only in its temporal application, 
can be seen as applicable even more aptly to that atemporal mode of exis-
tence; for biological life, or any other sort of temporal duration, is character-
ized by a peculiar non-durational evanescence. Our past is already lost to us, 
our future is not yet accessible, and even a little consideration of our present, 
the time at which we actually exist, shows it to be a duration less instant, the 
unextended boundary between our past and our future. No life that is imper-
fect in being necessarily possessed with such radical incompleteness could 
be the mode of existence for an absolutely perfect being. The necessarily 
beginningless, endless life of an absolutely perfect being must be perfectly 
possessed and thus devoid of past and future; it must consist in an indivisibly 
persistent present actuality. 
An insistence on interpreting 'duration,' 'persistent,' 'life,' and 'present' in 
their ordinary temporal senses would effortlessly render the concept of eter-
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nity incoherent. But technical uses of familiar terms are common and go 
unprotested in other theoretical disciplines. The sciences, for example, regu-
larly employ ordinary words analogically to illuminate peculiar features of 
reality. And, of course, no one would suppose that it was a good argument 
against the possibility of black holes to point out that they couldn't literally 
be holes, or against the big bang theory to point out that the first physical 
event in the history of our universe couldn't literally have made any noise. 
Nor, on the other hand, would any informed person deny that there were 
aspects of the real nature of black holes or the big bang that rendered those 
designations more informative than others might have been.8 Showing that 
the concept of eternity is really incoherent, then, would require showing that 
the notion medieval philosophers were trying to capture with their technical 
terminology is incoherent even when we allow their unfamiliar uses of terms 
such as 'duration' and 'present.' 
4. Fitzgerald's Criticism 
One way of trying to show that the concept of timeless duration is really 
incoherent depends on developing a second difficulty stemming from the 
definition of eternity, one that goes beyond the terminological novelties to 
focus on the combination of timelessness and illimitability. An illimitable 
mode of existence is evidently an infinitely extended mode of existence. 
Since it seems that any extension can be divided, at least conceptually, it 
seems that the illimitability that characterizes eternity must entail conceptual 
divisibility. But if in virtue of being illimitable eternity is divisible, it shows 
signs of collapsing into sempiternity: beginningless, endless time. Some of 
the conceptually produced divisions of eternity would be before others of 
them, thus introducing succession into eternity. But since timelessness rules 
out succession, the combination of illimitability and timelessness makes eter-
nity look as if it is characterized essentially both by succession and by the 
absence of succession. 
This charge of more than superficial incoherence was forcefully raised in 
a recent article by Paul Fitzgerald.9 Anything that counts as extension, he 
says, is ordinarily expected to meet three conditions: (l) "two distinct par-
ticulars can both have the kind of extension in question"; (2) in every exten-
sion there must be extended "subphases" having that same mode of extension; 
and (3) "by having different positions along the extensive dimension in ques-
tion two qualitatively identical particulars can be numerically distinct. "10 If 
eternity fails to meet these conditions, Fitzgerald says, one wants to know 
why, and whether in that case eternal duration still counts as an extended 
mode of existence. If, on the other hand, eternity meets these conditions, one 
wants to know how eternity counts as timeless-i.e., successionless. 
Fitzgerald supposed that we would choose the second horn of this dilemma, 
466 Faith and Philosophy 
and that we would prevent eternity from collapsing into time by denying to 
it the possibility of succession. He thought we could accomplish that only by 
removing extension from eternal duration and reducing it to a point, thereby 
effectively abandoning the idea of atemporal duration. 
5. Reply to Fitzgerald 
In an earlier reply to Fitzgerald II we argued that denying succession to eter-
nity would collapse eternity to a point only in case all extension includes 
some sort of succession. But whether or not that is the case is just the point 
at issue between Fitzgerald and defenders of the doctrine of eternity, and so 
in assuming that the denial of succession is a denial of an extended mode of 
existence Fitzgerald begs the question. 12 And in fact we do not choose the 
second horn of Fitzgerald's dilemma, as he supposed we would, but rather 
the first: we deny that eternity meets the conditions for extension laid down 
by Fitzgerald. Underlying those conditions is his assumption that anything 
that can count as extended must be divisible; from his point of view some-
thing is either extended and thus divisible, or indivisible and thus unextended. 
And so he sees the doctrine of eternity as incoherent because it claims of the 
same mode of existence that it is both extended and indivisible. 13 
Our acceptance of the tradition that uses 'extended' in describing the 
atemporal mode of existence undoubtedly lends intuitive force to Fitzgerald's 
argument. If 'persistent' or any other reasonable alternative that occurred to 
us had seemed clearly less open to misinterpretation, we would have dis-
carded 'extended' in its favor. But, we argued in replying to Fitzgerald, his 
three conditions for extension are generalizations arrived at by considering 
samples of extension that are all temporal or spatial. Given the provenance 
of his conditions, it is not surprising that they will not apply to what is neither 
spatial nor temporal. That all extensions of time or space are at least poten-
tially or conceptually divisible is generally undisputed,14 but nothing in that 
fact" we argued, provides good grounds for inferring that what is atemporally 
extended must also be divisible. On the doctrine of eternity, the eternal pres-
ent persists, encompasses time, and is unbounded. In those respects it resem-
bles temporal duration enough to make it helpful to speak of eternity as 
extended, in something like the way it is helpful to speak of a collapsed star 
as a hole. On the other hand, because it lacks succession, it fails to resemble 
spatial and temporal extensions in being divisible. And to conclude on the 
basis of the characteristics it does share with temporal duration that it must 
also be like it in all other respects is like thinking that a collapsed star must 
be an opening in space because it is in some respects appropriately charac-
terized as a hole. 
In our view, these considerations reveal serious shortcomings in 
Fitzgerald's attempt to show that the doctrine of eternity is incoherent. But 
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we have also come to think that we did not do enough to answer the question 
implicit in the first horn of Fitzgerald's dilemma: If, as we claim, eternity 
does not meet his conditions for extension, then in what sense can we say 
that it is extended? We return to this question below. 
6. Nelson:S Criticism 
In Tillie and Eternityl5 Brian Leftow replies to several objections against the 
concept of eternity in ways that strike us as entirely adequate. But there is 
one sort of objection, similar to the one Fitzgerald raised, that Leftow seems 
disposed to concede in a version developed by Herbert Nelson: 
... the conditions definitive of atemporal duration seem mutually inconsistent. 
On the one hand, as enduring and therefore ... really and indeed infinitely 
extended, the atemporally enduring entity must have stages which really lie 
outside one another in some sense, and thus not be all at once .... On the other 
hand, as atelllporal and therefore . . .really existing all at once ... , no real con-
stituent [of it] can be absent when any other is present. Thus at every moment 
of the infinite duration of the atemporally enduring entity every other moment-
and there must be infinitely many eternal moments-must be present as well. To 
have atemporality, the genuine differentiation of parts or stages required for 
real extension must be suppressed. To have duration, the absence of differ-
entiated parts or stages required for atemporality must be suppressed. 16 
The core of this objection is virtually the same as Fitzgerald's. But Nelson's 
criticism is distinguished by his supposition that in attributing duration and 
presentness to God we are presupposing some genus common to God and crea-
tures since temporal entities are also said to have duration and presentness. 
Nelson sees this as a "commitment to univocity" on our part,17 and he pro-
tests that predicates are not to be attributed to God and creatures univocally. 
The crucial claim in Nelson's argument, as in Fitzgerald's, is that extended 
eternity essentially involves a plurality and thus must be divisible: "to say 
that atemporal duration is infinitely extended entails that in it an infinite 
number of different positions can be designated." We might avoid divisibility, 
he suggests, but only by falling into another well-known sort of difficulty 
regarding discourse about God-only, that is, in case "there is some radical 
equivocation lurking in the use of 'extension' and defeating the whole point 
of their insistence on the fundamental importance of including extended 
atemporal duration in the concept of eternity. "18 
7. Reply to Nelson 
Predicating the same characteristics of God and creatures, however, does not 
entail predicating them univocally, thus presupposing a genus common to 
God and creatures. If it did, Nelson himself could be accused of the very 
mistake he attributes to us, because he predicates knowledge, freedom, and 
causation of God.I'l But, of course, it has long been maintained in the tradition 
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of Christian philosophical theology that no such entailment holds. So 
Aquinas, for example, attributes to God not only knowledge and freedom (as 
Nelson does), duration and presentness (as we do), but also goodness, justice, 
and love, without supposing that he is thereby in conflict with his own argued 
position that no characteristic can be predicated univocally of God and crea-
tures. Instead, he maintains that although God's knowledge, duration, or 
goodness are not identical with those characteristics among creatures, there 
is likeness enough to warrant using those ordinary terms of God (with the 
proper caveats against interpreting them univocally). 
On the other hand, the fact that we deny divisibility to atemporal duration 
does not mean that we are predicating duration equivocally of God and 
creatures. To begin with, we are inclined to doubt even Nelson's assumption 
that every instance of duration in lillie is divisible. Consider the specious 
present-for example, the specious present during which a mother hears her 
son yell for help as he flies off his skateboard. The specious present is 
different from the metaphysical temporal present in being extended. It takes 
time, however little, for the mother to apprehend and process the various 
sounds that constitute the utterance 'help,' identify the utterance as her son's, 
and understand it. That time is of course conceptually divisible, but only into 
parts of that time, not into parts of the mother's specious present, which is 
characterized by her hearing her son yell for help. She may pick up theoret-
ically distinguishable component sounds in conceptually divisible parts of 
the time underlying her specious present, but in none of those parts does she 
hear her son yell for help. Nor does she successively acquire each individual 
sound, remember it, and then integrate her short-term memories to produce 
in herself the experience of hearing 'help.' Reflections on the ludicrousness 
of such an account contributed to the original introduction of the notion of a 
specious present.20 The specious present, then, seems to be an instance of 
something that is both extended and conceptually indivisible as such. 21 It is 
also a particularly apposite instance since, as William Alston has suggested, 
it is illuminating to think of the eternal present as God's specious present, 
which covers all of time.22 A temporal being might naturally be inclined to 
impose on such a universally overarching specious present the divisions ap-
propriate to time, but imposed temporal divisions are as inapplicable to the 
eternal present as they would be to the mother's specious present. 
But even if, for the sake of the argument, we grant Nelson his assumption 
that everything temporal and extended is divisible, it doesn't follow that we 
are using the terms 'duration' or 'extension' equivocally of God and creatures. 
Nelson's criticism can be seen as presenting us with an apparent dilemma. If 
God is absolutely simple or transcendent, as traditional Christian theology 
claims, then many terms cannot be predicated univocally of God and crea-
tures. On the other hand, only a radically agnostic theism would maintain 
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that terms ordinarily predicated of creatures can be predicated of God only 
equivocally. But this dilemma is only apparent. Analogical predication is the 
traditionally recognized way between its horns.23 
Knowledge, for example, is commonly said to be predicated of God and 
creatures analogically, not univocally or equivocally. But precisely which 
features of creaturely knowledge are features of divine knowledge too, and 
precisely what in God takes the place of features of creaturely knowledge 
that are obviously inappropriate to him-these are things we could say only 
in case we could comprehend God's sort of knowledge better than we can, 
in which case we would of course be able to explain more of it in univocal 
terms. Where univocal accounts are theoretically unavailable and equivocal 
predication is worse than worthless, we may be said to be in circumstances 
of irreducibly analogical predication. Similarly, in seeking those features of 
eternal extension (or duration, or presentness) that take the place of the 
analogous temporal features, in seeking even a list of all the features shared 
by temporal and atemporal duration, etc., critics of the concept of eternity 
are seeking what cannot be found if, as we maintain, this, too, is a case of 
irreducibly analogical predication. 
Still, none of this is to say that human beings cannot develop an intelligible 
account of God's nature or mode of existence. On the basis of analogical 
predication we can say, for example, that essentially illimitable eternal dura-
tion, like conceivably unbounded temporal duration, is a measure of exis-
tence, indicating some degree of permanence of some sort on the part of 
something that persists-although, of course, divine existence, permanence, 
and persistence will be analogous to, not identical with, temporal existence, 
permanence, and duration. Acknowledging the impossibility of predicating 
certain terms univocally of God and creatures does not, as Nelson suggests 
it does, drive us into using them equivocally. Analogical predication remains 
available, and, here as elsewhere in subject matter that lies beyond experi-
ence, it leaves open a way along which understanding can be developed. 
Relationships Between Eternity and Time 
8. Time and Eternity Compared with Nelson s Alpha and Beta 
Analogical predication may be the fundamenta' use of analogy in philosophy, 
but it is by no means the only one. Explanatory analogies seem indispensable, 
and they range from suggestive similes through arguments to full theories.24 
Somewhere in that range are philosophical stories, for which Plato's myth of 
the cave is an apt paradigm. Philosophical stories are employed not as mere 
illustrations but as means of reducing the strangeness in analogical predica-
tion by providing imaginable access to concepts that are not obviously in-
stantiated in ordinary experience. 
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Nelson's rejection of the concept of atemporal duration rests heavily on a 
philosophical story, which is also intended to challenge our account of the 
relationship between time and eternity. "Suppose that, in addition to the 
physical universe which we inhabit [Alpha], there exists another physical 
universe [Beta] not physically, spatially, or temporally related to our own . 
.. . No thing or event in Alpha exists or occurs before or after or at the same 
time as any thing or event in Beta. No thing or event in Beta is in the past 
or the future or the present of any thing or event in Alpha .... There is no now 
common to Alpha and Beta. "25 
Nelson intends his story of Alpha and Beta to shed some light on the 
relationship between eternity and time as we presented it. 26 Like Nelson's 
Alpha and Beta, temporal creatures and eternal God have no connections that 
could be univocally described as spatial or as temporal; but unlike Alpha and 
Beta, creatures and God are not totally disconnected. 
As Nelson would of course agree, a total separation between God and 
creatures would be incompatible with many religious beliefs and practices. 
Consider petitionary prayer. Suppose that one person in Beta-call her 
'Venus' -had the role of God for some person in Alpha-call him' Aeneas'; 
and suppose that today Aeneas prays to Venus for calm seas tomorrow. Given 
the total disconnection of these two worlds, it isn't clear that Venus can know 
what Aeneas is asking or bring about events in Alpha. But suppose, for the 
sake of argument, that causal and cognitive relationships between these dis-
connected worlds are somehow possible. So suppose Venus can somehow 
know that Aeneas prays at tI, and can somehow efficaciously will calm seas 
in Alpha at t2. What Venus cannot do, even on this generous supposition, is 
hear Aeneas's prayer, be with him in his anxiety, or be related to him in any 
way that counts as or is presupposed in direct awareness. Such acts or rela-
tionships require some sort of simultaneity between Alpha and Beta and so 
would violate Nelson's stipulations regarding them. On our generous suppo-
sition Venus could, of course, cause Aeneas to believe that she had heard his 
prayer or that she was with him; but those beliefs induced in him would be 
false. Nelson's story does not present our notion of atemporal duration or of 
the relationship between eternity and time. 
9. The Story of Aleph 
Still, Nelson is on the right track in thinking that telling a story is the most 
efficient way in which to try to get some idea of God's mode of existence 
without using ordinary terms either univocally or equivocally. Human beings' 
attempts at this sort of thing are attempts to think themselves up the ladder 
of being, so to speak: in some respects the theological equivalent of trying 
to write a story about a person whose mode of existence involves a space 
with more dimensions than our own. Failure to appreciate the nature of this 
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universal creaturely predicament characterizes many criticisms of the doc-
trine of eternity. For example, like Fitzgerald, Leftow argues that if atemporal 
duration does not have the features that characterize spatial and temporal 
extension, if it is not the equivalent of a line, then it collapses into the 
equivalent of a point. 27 But this inference holds only if it exhausts the possi-
bilities for any mode of existence to describe it either as linelike or as 
pointlike, and there is no good reason to think that modes of existence higher 
up the ladder of being or of more dimensions than our own are limited in that 
way. 
Putting the problem in this way suggests a possible way of dealing with it. 
Because it is easier to think oneself down, rather than up, the ladder of being, 
it may be helpful to tell a story in which eternity is represented by our mode 
of existence, and time is represented by a mode of existence lower than ours. 
Consider a finite one-dimensional world, Aleph, inhabited by inch-long 
intelligent beings arrayed sequentially and contiguously in the line-segment 
that comprises their world.28 Any of these Alephians may have many others 
in front of or behind him, but only one other inhabitant can be immediately 
in front of or behind him. Because Aleph is one-dimensional, no Alephian 
can share its place with another. Alephians recognize an absolute here, their 
designation for the location of whichever single Alephian happens to have 
the mid-point of the line segment within his own length. Alephians come into 
existence at the A I end of the line, move slowly and steadily toward here, 
where they reach the height of their mental powers, and pass on into deteri-
oration, culminating in their termination at the A2 end. They designate places 
between Al and here the hither, places between here and A2 the hence. 
Alephians thus have spatial analogues for the A- and B-series in time, but 
with this difference, that in Aleph the spatial relationship corresponding to 
simultaneity-being-at-the-same-place-as or, in particular, being-here-
with-is reflexive only.29 
Suppose that Monica, a human being, has all of Aleph horizontally across 
her field of vision and is able to interact cognitively and causally with all the 
creatures in the line-world. In particular, she has been able to make Nabal, an 
Alephian, directly aware of her; he also hears and understands what she says. 
"Where are you, Monica?," says Nabal; "Whom are you behind?" 
''I'm not behind any of you," says Monica. 
"You're not? Then there's no one in front of you. You're at the point of 
termination, poor thing." 
"Well, no," says Monica; "you're all in front of me." 
"You're contradicting yourself," retorts Nabal; "it can't be the case both 
that you're behind no one and that everyone is in front of you." 
"Well," says Monica hesitantly, "it's hard to explain to you, but I'm not 
part of Aleph; I'm not in line at all." 
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"Not in line?! Then you must be an isolated point! But that makes no sense; 
how could a point say anything?" 
Monica tries to explain: ''I'm neither a point nor a line. I'm outside your 
world, and the relations that govern your world don't apply to me. In my 
mode of existence I can have all of you in front of me without being behind 
any of you." 
Nabal finds this no help at all: "Just consider what 'behind' and 'in front 
of' mean. Unless you're talking sheer nonsense, you must be using those 
expressions equivocally. Please tell me, then, what meaning are you giving 
those expressions?" 
"Well," says Monica, giving it a try, "when I say that you're all in front of 
me, I mean that we're all here together." 
"Worse and worse! Kindly think before you speak! I am here. Eglon is in 
front of me, in the hence; Balak is behind me, in the hither. The hence and 
the hither include a\l the places other than here. If, as you say, we are all here 
together, Balak and Eglon are both here and not here. Isn't that plainly 
incoherent?" 
"No, it isn't," Monica hurries to explain, "because 'here' is a relational 
term: Eglon and Balak are here with respect to me but not here with respect 
to you." 
"I knew it would come to this," says Nabal; "now you're denying the 
absolute here." 
"I'm not," says Monica frustratedly. "I acknowledge that for you in Aleph 
there is an absolute here; but for me, in my world, there's a different sort of 
here, relating me to all of you in such a way that from my point of view you 
Alephians and I are all here together even though in your world you're not 
here together." 
Nabal retorts: "There couldn't be a here of the sort you claim for yourself, 
an extended here that would encompass you and all of us. Only precisely one 
thing can be here. The fact that there is a plurality of Alephians requires that 
we be ordered in line. When you talk of our all being here together, you are 
simply confusing two views. On the one hand, the here cannot be shared. On 
the other hand, there can be the sort of extension that accommodates more 
than one of us, but only in virtue of our linear ordering, which is just what 
precludes there being more than one of us here. The fundamental incoherence 
in your thought is the notion that we could all be here together in some 
extended here." 
Understandably, Nabal cannot envisage Monica's three-dimensional world, 
from the standpoint of which it really is the case that she and all the Alephians 
are here together, without in any way implying that the relations that obtain 
within Nabal's world are illusory or that the Alephians are really three-di-
mensional. Nabal wants Monica to explain to him the sort of here she's 
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talking in, but he wants the explanation only in terms of relations that obtain 
in his own world, and he rejects as equivocation her attempts to give him 
such an explanation using those terms analogically. The only sort of expla-
nation Nabal would accept is one in which Monica uses terms univocally of 
things in her world and in Aleph. But that is just the sort of explanation she 
can't give, because the relations that obtain between her mode of existence 
and Nabal's are different from any relations that obtain within Aleph. 
She could, however, take another tack, offering Nabal an account of being-
at-the-same-place-as that would hold between herself and every Alephian, 
and introducing it under a neologism- 'being at the MN-same place as' (or 
'MNP' for short)-in order to avoid accusations of equivocation. The point 
of this exercise would be to show Nabal something of the logic of terms that 
relate to her world by defining the nature of the fundamentally relevant 
relationship between her world and his. With the aid of MNP, Nabal would 
be able to see that some of his attempts to reduce the notion of a three-di-
mensional world to an absurdity are too facile. But this way of defending the 
notion is very different from the futile exercise of explaining Monica's world 
to Nabal using only his terms with only the meanings he attaches to them. 
Because of the radical difference between their worlds, Monica can't use 
Nabal's terms in that way to describe her world. On the other hand, if she 
used his terms equivocally, she would still be unable to describe her world 
to Nabal unless she could explain to him in univocal language the novel 
meanings she was attaching to his terms-something she cannot do. Besides 
spelling out the nature of the fundamentally relevant relationship between 
her world and his, the best she can do is resort to analogy-from similes to 
stories-in an attempt to prompt Nabal's intuitions, stirring him to think 
himself up the ladder of being. A more fully satisfying kind of account that 
at first seems only reasonable to expect from her turns out to involve the 
univocity that is theoretically unattainable in her communication with a being 
in a different mode of existence. 
These considerations seem to us appropriate and sufficient by way of a 
general rejoinder to Nelson's objections and Fitzgerald's first question,30 all 
of which consist ultimately in demands that features of eternity be defined 
in terms that apply univocally to eternity and time (and perhaps even to 
extension universally). 
10. Revising the Definition of ET-Simultaneity 
As we shall see, the story of Aleph is useful also for suggesting a way of 
clarifying the relationship between eternity and time. Although eternity and time 
are conceived of as two separate modes of real existence, neither of which is 
reducible to the other or to any third thing, they are not conceived of as isolated 
from each other. God, an eternal being, is conceived of as omniscient and as 
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the creator of everything that is in time, and human beings existing in time 
are taken to be able to interact directly with God (in prayer, for example). 
But what sort of relationship could obtain between beings whose modes of 
existence are as disparate as time and eternity? Because eternity is timeless, 
nothing can be earlier or later than, or past or future with respect to anything 
else, either within eternity itself or in case one of the relata is eternal and the 
other temporal. But since eternity is also characterized as (conscious, active) 
life, presentness must be a feature of eternity. And if what is eternal is to be 
related cognitively or causally to anything temporal, the relationship must be 
characterized by simultaneity, which, unlike priority and posteriority, is not 
ruled out by timelessness. 
Of course, if simultaneity must be understood as occurrence or existence 
at the same tillie, then clearly the concept of eternal-temporal relationships 
is incoherent, and nothing eternal can be simultaneous with anything else, 
eternal or temporal. In "Eternity" we dealt with this difficulty by defining a 
species of simultaneity that would hold between eternal and temporal entities 
or events. Since simultaneity may be thought of generically as co-existence 
or co-occurrence, it might be supposed that at any rate temporal simultaneity 
can be spelled out as co-existence or co-occurrence at the same time. Con-
siderations of relativity, however, require that simultaneity be relativized to 
reference frames, so that a more precise formulation of temporal simultaneity 
would develop along these lines: co-occurrence or co-existence at the same 
time within a particular reference frame. Generalizing this approach to rela-
tions between time and eternity, we formulated a simultaneity relationship 
between eternity and time (ET-simultaneity): 
(ET) For every x and y (where x and y range over entities and events), x 
and yare ET-simultaneous iff 
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and 
(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x 
and yare both present-i.e., either x is eternally present and y 
is observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and 
(iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal 
reference frames, x and yare both present-Le., either x is ob-
served as eternally present and y is temporally present, or vice 
versa. 
It should be noticed that ET-simultaneity is symmetric but (unlike temporal 
simultaneity) neither reflexive nor transitive. 3l The formulation of ET-simul-
taneity in terms of observers should not mislead anyone. By 'observer' here 
we mean only that thing, animate or inanimate, with respect to which the 
reference frame is picked out and with respect to which the simultaneity of 
events within the reference frame is determined. 32 
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Some aspects of ET-simultaneity may be more intuitively apparent in a 
picture that has heuristic value although it is in some ways crude and mis-
leading. Imagine two parallel horizontal lines, the upper one representing 
eternity and the lower, time; and let presentness be represented by light. Then 
from a temporal viewpoint the temporal present is represented by a dot of 
light moving steadily along the lower line, which is in this way lighted 
successively, while the eternal present is represented by the upper line's being 
entirely lighted at once. So from a temporal viewpoint the temporal present 
is ET-simultaneous with the infinite present of an eternal being's life. On the 
other hand, from the viewpoint of a being existing in the persisting eternal 
present, each temporal instant is ET-simultaneous with the eternal present, 
but only insofar as that instant is temporally present, so that from the eternal 
being's point of view the entire time line is lighted at once. From an eternal 
viewpoint, every present time is present, co-occurrent with the infinite whole 
of the eternal present. 
What is present to an entity depends on its mode of existence. What is 
present to an eternal entity may be present, past, or future to some particular 
temporal entity, just as some building may be to the right with respect to one 
frame of reference but to the left with respect to another. 33 An eternal entity's 
mode of existence is such that its whole life is ET-simultaneous with each 
and every temporal entity or event. Any particular temporal event, such as 
the opening of the Berlin Wall or the end of apartheid in South Africa is, as 
it is occurring, ET-simultaneous with the eternal present. But, relative to us, 
given our location on the temporal continuum in early 1993, the first of those 
events is past, and the second is future. 
This understanding of ET-simultaneity strikes us as sufficient to dispose of 
many of the problems that have been raised about the relationship between 
eternity and time. But it now seems to us that the definition of ET-simulta-
neity itself gives rise to a problem. 
11. A Problem in the Definition of ET-Simultaneity 
William Hasker has recently argued that if the fundamentally relevant meta-
physical relationship between an eternal being and temporal beings is cor-
rectly portrayed in our definition, then eternal God could not be directly 
aware of temporal facts.34 Moreover, God could not be with human beings 
directly and immediately, in the way most theists believe he is. The definition 
of ET-simultaneity suggests that an eternal God could "observe" human be-
ings as present to him but couldn't actually share their present. In general, 
Hasker thinks, 
(H) To be directly aware of temporal beings requires being temporal oneself. 
Hasker's objection is the mirror-image of one raised by Delmas LewisY 
476 Faith and Philosophy 
Lewis argues that if temporal beings are really present to an eternal being, 
they must be present in that being's mode of existence-i.e., they must be 
eternal. Otherwise, Lewis thinks, they will be only epistemically and not also 
metaphysically present to the eternal being. But if time and eternity are 
incompatible modes of existence, at least in the sense that what is essentially 
temporal cannot also be eternal, then, according to Lewis, the doctrine of 
eternity has the unwelcome consequence that temporal beings are only epi-
stemically present to God. Lewis's argument seems to rest on this principle: 
(L) To be metaphysically present to an eternal being, a thing must be 
eternal itself. 
We are inclined to think that both (H) and (L) are false. (H) appears to 
depend on a more general principle: 
(GP) x can be directly aware of or epistemically present to y only if x and y 
share the same mode of existence; 
and (GP) certainly is incompatible with our concept of ET-simultaneity. But 
surely neither Hasker nor any traditional theist would be willing to accept 
(GP) as applied to space. Since God is traditionally described as non-spatial, 
it would follow from (GP) that God cannot be directly aware of spatial beings. 
And if traditional theists cannot accept (GP) as applied to space, they cannot 
reasonably apply it to time. If God can be directly aware of his creatures 
without sharing their spatial mode of existence,36 why should we suppose 
that he cannot be directly aware of them without sharing their temporal mode 
of existence? (H), therefore, seems false. 
And similar considerations weigh against (L). God is traditionally de-
scribed as omnipresent-i.e., every spatial location is present to him. But 
according to (L) the attribute of omnipresence would require either that 
spatial locations be non-spatial or that non-spatial God be spatial. If, then, 
(L) is false as regards space, why should we accept it as regards time? 
We suspect that our definition of ET-simultaneity may perhaps have moti-
vated the sort of objections Lewis and Hasker raise. In it we gloss x's being 
present partly in terms of x's being observed as present by "some observer," 
thereby suggesting a gap in presentness that is bridged by no more than 
"observation." This way of putting the matter, familiar enough in the context 
from which we derived the elements of our definition, appears to be mislead-
ing in a theological setting, generating the objection that an eternal God 
cannot really be with or directly aware of human beings. So, having called 
(H) and (L) into question, we want to revise the definition of ET-simultaneity 
in order to alleviate the sort of concern they represent. 
12. MNP and ET-Simultaneity 
Looking carefully at the relationship between Monica and Nabal in the story 
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of Aleph helps to show the way to revise the definition. An attempt at spelling 
out the MNP relationship in a form analogous to the definition of ET-simul-
taneity would look like this: 
(MNP) For every x and every y (where 'x' and 'y' range over entities and 
events in the three-dimensional world and in Aleph), x and yare 
related by MNP iff 
(i) x is three-dimensional and y is Alephian, or vice versa (for 
convenience, let x be three-dimensional and y Alephian); and 
(ii) with respect to a particular three-dimensional entity M, x and y 
are both here-i.e., (a) x is three-dimensionally here with respect 
to M, (b) y occupies the Alephian here, and (c) both x and yare 
situated with respect to M in such a way that M can enter into 
direct and immediate causal relations with each of them and (if 
capable of awareness) can be directly aware of each of them; and 
(iii) with respect to a particular Alephian entity. N, x and yare 
both here-i.e., (a) x is in the three-dimensional reference-
frame relative to which y is three-dimensionally present, (b) 
y=N, and (c) both x and yare situated with respect to N in 
such a way that N can enter into direct and immediate causal 
relations with each of them and (if capable of awareness) can 
be directly aware of each of them. 
Like ET-simultaneity, MNP is symmetric but not reflexive or transitive. 
Nabal can be MNP with respect to Monica, but not with respect to himself. 
If Eglon is MNP with respect to Monica, and Monica is MNP with respect 
to Balak, it won't follow that Eglon is MNP with respect to Balak. 
Our notion of the temporal present and our notion of a spatial here are not 
completely alike, however. Perhaps the most important difference is that as 
it is used in the definition of ET-simultaneity, 'present' is an indexical, indi-
cates a relationship (being-present-to), and refers to the absolute present. 
'Here' in MNP does not have the same range. In particular, there is no 
three-dimensional spatial analogue to the absolute present. 
The second and third conditions in MNP suggest a less misleading way to 
formulate the corresponding clauses in a revised definition of ET-simultaneity: 
(ET') For every x and every y, x and yare ET-simultaneous if and only if 
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa (for conve-
nience, let x be eternal and y temporal); and 
(ii) with respect to some A in the unique eternal reference frame, 
x and yare both present-i.e., (a) x is in the eternal present 
with respect to A, (b) y is in the temporal present, and (c) both 
x and yare situated with respect to A in such a way that A can 
enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each of 
them and (if capable of awareness) can be directly aware of 
each of them; and 
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(iii) with respect to some B in one of the infinitely many temporal 
reference frames, x and yare both present-i.e., (a) x is in the 
eternal present, (b) y is at the same time as B, and (c) both x 
and yare situated with respect to B in such a way that B can 
enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each of 
them and (if capable of awareness) can be directly aware of 
each of them. 
This revision of ET-simultaneity, in our view, alleviates the concerns of 
both Hasker and Lewis. The clauses specifying direct and immediate causal 
relations and direct awareness between what is temporal and what is eternal 
imply that an eternal God could have temporal entities as the immediate 
objects of his awareness, even though he is eternal and they are not. Those 
clauses also imply that temporal entities and events are metaphysically pres-
ent to God and not just epistemically present. If being metaphysically present 
is not entirely captured by these specifications, it is not clear to us what else 
is necessary. If anything else should turn out to be necessary, we see no reason 
offhand why it could not be added since it strikes us as intuitively clear that 
there is nothing in the difference between time and eternity that prevents 
metaphysical presence. 37 
13. Conclusion 
We are painfully aware of difficulties in the concept of eternity.38 We also 
think that conceiving of God as the absolutely perfect being entails recogniz-
ing that his mode of existence must be eternity rather than time. Theists 
committed to conceiving of God in that way are thereby committed to the 
struggle to make sense of eternity, of atemporal duration, of a timeless being's 
presence in time, knowledge of time, and action in time. Philosophers and 
theologians are of course right to be suspicious of a concept whose coherence 
is repeatedly challenged, but we hope in this paper to have met some of the 
recent challenges of that sort and to have shown that the challenges often 
arise out of misunderstanding the doctrine or overlooking the special charac-
ter of its mode of expression. 39 
Eleonore Stump, St. Louis University 
Norman Kretzmann, Cornell University 
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